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Abstract 
 
Background 
Prescribed  medicines  are  delivered  through  a  variety  of 
routes to patients in the UK National Health Service (NHS) 
and  are  regulated  by  a  host  of  health  and  trade  related 
policy and law.  These ensure the efficient and safe supply 
of  medicines  of  appropriate  quality  from  the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer through to the end-user, the 
patient.    However,  persisting  medication  errors  and  the 
recent discovery of counterfeit medicines in the bona fide 
supply chain have meant there are growing concerns about 
the  timely,  accurate  and  safe  supply  of  medicines  in  the 
NHS. 
 
Methods 
This study undertakes a systems design approach to process 
modelling and understanding three key supply routes from 
the  manufacturer  through  to  the  patient,  across  both 
primary and secondary care.   A systems design approach 
was deployed to investigate complex interactions between 
professionals,  products  and  processes  to  improve  patient 
safety  in  collaboration  with  twenty  five  clinical  and  non-
clinical  stakeholders across the supply chain and six end-
user patients.  
 
Results 
Several  system process models were developed  from the 
literature,  field  observations  and  alongside  the 
interviewees.    The  results  reveal  that  risk  to  medication 
safety is perceived as occurring most at the patient-end of 
the medicines supply chain:  the pharmacy and the ward.  
There  are  differences  observed  in  the  responses  of 
interviewees when they engage with system models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper reflects on the use of a systems design, a mainly 
engineering  approach,  to  understanding  a  health  care 
domain  problem  of  medication  errors.    The  approach 
provided  an  enhanced  insight  into  the  complex  set  of 
system  factors  and  interactions  involved  in  generating 
medication errors.  This study is among the first to develop a 
systems-wide view of the medicines supply process ‘as-is’ 
and identify opportunities for re-design to improve patient 
safety. 
 
 
Background  
Medication errors and the recent discovery of counterfeit 
medicines in the bona fide supply chain have meant there 
are growing concerns about the timely, accurate and safe 
supply  of  medicines  in  the  NHS  [1,  2].  A  systems  design 
approach,  Design  for  Patient  Safety,  is  advocated  by 
Clarkson  et  al  to  consider  complex  interactions  between 
professionals,  products  and  processes  to  improve  patient 
safety  [3].  Prescribing  errors  have  been  described  as  the 
“single commonest cause of medical errors” and present a 
significant patient safety challenge  for modern healthcare 
systems  as  they  continue  to  persist  despite  policy  and 
organisational  interventions  [4].  There  are  various 
definitions of what constitutes as a medication error, but 
there  is  consensus  that  it  is  essentially  “a  failure  in  the 
[medicine]  treatment  process  that  leads  to,  or  has  the 
potential to lead to, harm to the patient” [5].  This definition 
therefore  includes  errors  of  omission  (absence  of 
medication  required  to  treat  a  patient)  and  commission 
(medication not used appropriately or as intended). 
 
In the UK, the NHS is the sole healthcare provider where 
approximately 2.3 million medicines are prescribed each day 
[6].  However, to date the role of the pharmaceutical supply 
chain in medication error (or the medicines journey from 
the manufacturer through to the patient) and the associated 
risk  in  this  process  remains  largely  unexplored  in  the 
published  literature.    Studies  have  typically  focused  on 
aspects  of  supply  namely  the  hospital  pharmacy  supply 
chain  and  its  operational  features  and  more  recently  on 
counterfeit medicines entering the bona fide supply chain 
[7,  8,  9].    Primary  care  supply  routes  have  seldom  been 
explored  and  the  supply  chain  in  its  entirety  has  been 
ignored. 
 
There are three main supply routes for prescribed medicines 
in the NHS, in addition to the growing and emerging supply 
of  medicines  through  the  home  care  and  internet 
pharmacies path.  In primary care, medicines are typically 
prescribed by a General Practitioner (GP) and taken by the 
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patient to be dispensed at a community pharmacy, if the GP 
is  not  a  dispensing  doctor  (where  medicines  would  have 
been dispensed at the surgery)
1.  There are two main types 
of  pharmacy  in  the  community,  chain  or  independent 
pharmacies,  but  both  carry  out  the  same  function  of 
supplying and counselling patients about medicines.   
 
In hospital (i.e. secondary care) medicines are prescribed by 
the doctor and screened by the pharmacist.  They are then 
dispensed  and  checked  in  the  hospital  pharmacy.    If  the 
patient  is  being  treated  in  the  ward  or  other  short  stay 
departments, like the medical admission unit, they are sent 
by  pharmacy  to  be  self-administered  by  patients  or 
administered by a nurse.  If the patient is being treated on 
an  out-patient  basis  then  medicines  are  directly  given  to 
patients and they receive counselling on how to use them.   
 
Both community and hospital pharmacies receive medicines 
from  either  UK  or  EU  wholesalers  or  logistic  service 
providers (LSPs) that are wholesalers that supply medicines 
to pharmacies on behalf of the manufacturer.  Wholesalers 
and  LSPs  obtain  medicines  from  pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. 
 
Currently, the pharmaceutical supply process is regulated by 
the NHS and various supporting regulatory agencies such as 
the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) and the NHS Purchasing Supply Agency (PASA) to 
ensure the safe, efficient and timely supply of medicines. 
 
The aim of this study is to apply a systems design approach 
to understand the role of the pharmaceutical supply chain 
in  medication  error.    This  study  is  novel  in  using  this  to 
understand medication errors by modelling the journey that 
medicines  make  from  the  manufacturer  through  to  the 
patient in the NHS.  The power in this approach, advocated 
by  Clarkson  et  al  (2004),  is  that  it  engages  both  the 
researcher  and  stakeholders  to  consider  the  complex 
interactions  between  professionals,  products  and 
processes.  Dieter and Schmidt (2009) argue that systems 
design  facilitates  the  “evaluation  of  the  performance  of 
parts, products and systems” that can be considered as a 
central  activity  of  engineers  and  systems  designers  to 
ensure  the  safe  and  efficient  operation  of  organisations 
[10].   
 
A series of systems models of this supply chain have been 
developed and used to investigate whether all parts arrive 
where  they  are  needed  at  the  required  time,  where  the 
most  risk  lies,  and  how  any  changes  in  the  process  can 
reduce  medication  error  from  respondents  across  the 
supply chain.  According to Pidd (2004) the main advantage 
of systems models is that they “make things explicit in such 
a  way  that  understanding  and  change  can  occur”  [11].  
Therefore  it  can  be  argued  that  the  systems  design 
approach  uses  modelling  to  elicit  an  understanding  of 
problems  and  provide  answers/solutions  to  solve  system 
problems. 
                                                 
1 These tend to exist in rural communities where there are few 
pharmacies 
 
This  study  is  particularly  timely  as  three  major 
pharmaceutical companies have extended their control of 
medicines in the supply chain, by choosing to directly supply 
pharmacies  with  medicines,  without  traditional 
intermediary  wholesalers.    Instead,  logistics  service 
providers are contracted to distribute medicines on behalf 
of  the  company.    It  is  likely  that  other  pharmaceutical 
companies  will  follow  suit  in  changing  their  supply 
arrangements.  Although, the Office of  Fair Trading (OFT) 
has considered the competition and cost implications of this 
scheme  to  the  NHS  [12],  until  this  study,  no  formal  risk 
assessment has been taken to understand the consequences 
of this change for patient safety.   
 
Methods  
Study Design 
This  study  employed  qualitative  methodology  mainly  semi-
structured interviews.  Field observations of most parts of the 
supply chain (general practitioner practices, dispensing doctor 
practices,  community  pharmacies,  hospital  wards  and 
hospital  pharmacies)  were  undertaken  to  help  develop 
accurate system models.   
 
Participants 
A  combination  of  purposive  and  snowball  sampling 
techniques  were  employed  to  identify  participants.    An 
informal  stakeholder  analysis  was  performed  whereby 
participants were asked at the interview who they thought 
should be interviewed.   
 
Twenty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
a variety of  stakeholders  from the  medicines  supply chain, 
including pharmacists, wholesalers, pharmaceutical industry 
representatives, regulators and policy-makers.  Fourteen of 
these respondents were healthcare professionals with clinical 
roles and eleven were regulators, industry and policy-maker 
representatives.   
 
Six patients  were also recruited in the study after  ethical 
approval  by  Cambridge  Local  Research  Ethics  Committee 
was granted.  Patient participants were recruited with the 
help of a local general practitioner who wrote to patients on 
behalf of the researcher.  The first six patients who made 
contact with the researcher were interviewed. 
Data Collection 
Each interview was divided into two parts: a conventional 
semi-structured interview followed by a graphic elicitation 
session (method described in Crilly, 2006) [13].  In the first 
part of the interview, respondents were asked to comment 
on  their  awareness  of  medication  errors,  where  they 
occurred, how they were managed and could be prevented.  
In  the  second  part,  a  graphic  elicitation  session, 
interviewees  were  presented  with  system  models  of  the 
supply chain.  These models (developed from the literature 
and field observations) not only facilitated an interactive in-
depth discussion about the current system (as respondents 
sketched or altered parts of the models) but also elicited the 
interviewees’ perceptions of risk in the system as they used 
the  models  to  identify  or  consider  the  most  risk  to 
medication safety in the process.  Australasian Medical Journal 2009, 1, 11, 121-128 
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Analysis 
Interviews  were  transcribed  verbatim  and  analysed  using 
the software N-Vivo (version 7).  The models of the supply 
chain  were  edited  to  incorporate  the  interviewees’ 
responses  and  a  final  top-level  map  depicting  the  supply 
chain in the NHS was developed by the researcher. 
 
 
Results  
Results overview 
Healthcare  professionals  reported  more  awareness  of 
medication  errors  and  had  tended  to  come  across  more 
potential  errors  than  actual  errors.    One  respondent 
commented that they had come across “many [errors] but 
you know, one is enough in our book so, you tend to work 
along  the  principle  that,  you  know,  one  is  unacceptable” 
(R14 Nurse). 
 
In  contrast,  non-clinical  interviewees  reported  anecdotal 
awareness  or  official  notification  of  errors  and  some 
acknowledged that this was far from an accurate reflection 
of reality.  “I think there’s a lot more goes on than we know, 
again I think it’s been like an iceberg…the bit that is visible 
we  know  about.  Unfortunately  an  enormous  amount  we 
don’t know about” (R1 Regulator). 
 
When interviewees were asked where they perceived most 
medication  errors  to  occur,  15  interviewees  identified 
pharmacy as being more error prone, 7 considered hospital 
wards  to  be  more  risky  and  3  felt  that  wholesalers  and 
manufacturers  introduced  risk  into  the  supply  chain  that 
continued through to the patient.  An example response is; 
“probably  in  the  pharmacy  dispensary.  Very  occasionally 
there’ll be something, something wrong with the drug when 
it comes from the manufacturer” (R13 Dispensing General 
Practitioner). 
 
The six patients interviewed demonstrated a sophisticated 
understanding  of  the  various  ways  they  could  obtain 
medicines.  The patient cohort comprised of three women 
and three men aged between 40-80 years old.  The average 
age  of  patients  was  61  years  old.    Four  out  of  the  six 
patients used a repeat prescription collection service – an 
arrangement  between  the  pharmacy  and  their  general 
practitioner  to  have  the  medicines  ready  for  collection, 
usually  within  3  days  of  the  patient’s  request.    The 
remaining  two  took  their  prescriptions  from  the  general 
practitioner  to  the  pharmacy  for  dispensing.    Half  of  the 
patients  considered  the  lack  of  continuity  of  supply  and 
foreign  imports  of  medicines  as  a  source  of  risk  to 
medication  safety  as  it  could  cause  confusion  when  they 
were taking medicines, but on the whole patients (5 out of 
6)  were  confident  in  the  system,  in  particular  the 
professionals, of ensuring safety. 
 
Results in more detail 
Using  the  supply  chain  system  models  led  to  a  greater 
understanding  of  the  current  system  ‘as-is’  by  the 
researcher as opposed to official descriptions.  There were 
very few comprehensive models or diagrams of parts of the 
supply  chain  and  therefore  asking  respondents  to  help 
develop this was vital. 
 
Several  system  process  models  were  developed  from  the 
literature,  field  observations  and  alongside  the 
interviewees.  There were generic models that described the 
supply process at a high level, such as the model illustrated 
in  Figure  1  and  models  that  were  specific  to  the  supply 
situation such as hospital or community supply as depicted 
in Figure 2 and 3 consecutively. 
 
There  were  differences  observed  in  the  responses  from 
interviewees  about  risk  in  the  system  with  the  process 
models.  Interviewees cited risk more widely than in the first 
interview part without the models.  Risk was described as 
arising from the  system and human factors: “It’s multiple 
factors actually I would say.  So in that sense introduction to 
the physical environment, the introduction to the way that 
systems  actually  function  in  the  pharmacy  and  even  the 
computer, that to me was, was the first big stumbling block I 
had. I think culminating into that, also the staff that I had, 
day  staff,  weekday  staff  and  weekend  staff  are  totally 
different” (R7 Pharmacist in  response to figure 2).   Some 
commented that risk was at every link: “Well, the risks are 
based  on  the  number  of  links  in  chain  and  whether  we 
understand” (R4 Regulator in response to figure 1).  This was 
in comparison to the interviews where there was a heavy 
bias  on  pharmacy  and  the  ward  for  being  the  most 
responsible for medication errors.  “The dispensary [hospital 
pharmacy]  is  the  main  worry  because  of  the  errors  they 
bring to the ward” (R15 Nurse in response to figure2).   
 
Furthermore,  interactions  between  staff,  medicines  and 
stages of the supply chain were pinpointed as introducing 
risk more than at interview alone and respondents tended 
to give multiple reasons for risk rather than single reasons.  
Previous  interview  responses  were  also  expanded  so  for 
example  if  the  pharmacy  was  identified  as  being  more 
responsible  than  issues  such  as  imported  medicines  from 
Europe, inappropriate medication ordering by the elderly or 
poor  communication  with  prescribers  was  described.  
Similarly for the ward, its layout and multiple locations of 
medicines,  the  delay  and  complexity  of  the  discharge 
process were recognized.   
 
There  were  no  observed  differences  in  the  role  of  the 
interviewee  to  their  ability  to  engage  and  think  about 
systems design.  For example, one patient on seeing Figure 2 
(the hospital process model) remarked: “Gosh that’s a long 
journey for a medicine” (P1 Patient in response to figure 1). 
 
Collectively interviewees identified that there were a lack of 
safeguards built into the system, which meant that not only 
did the detection of medication errors at each step become 
more difficult but there was concern that as errors made 
their journey to the patient they were compounded.  For 
example, one pharmacy respondent in hospital noted that 
“for  every  drug  we  dispense,  there  is  how  many 
administrations?  and  so  you  could  have  the  same 
administration error repeated over and over a time from one 
supply” (R6 Pharmacist in response to figure 2 and 3).   Australasian Medical Journal 2009, 1, 11, 121-128 
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Furthermore, most respondents felt that more needed to 
be done to deal with the threat of counterfeit medicines in 
the bona fide supply chain,  as they noted many possible 
entry  points  on  the  systems  models.  “I  would  say  it  can 
enter  the  chain  at  the  wholesaler  level  and  also  at  the 
pharmacy level mainly, which is worrying because of high 
levels of parallel imports” (R3 Manufacturer in response to 
figure 3) 
 
A  reduced  amount  of  medication  error  from  counterfeits 
and lack of continuity of supply was considered by  some 
non-clinical interviewees by the new changes of supply by 
manufacturers  through  logistic  service  providers.    It  was 
argued that the manufacturer had the line of sight of the 
medicine through to the pharmacy, which conferred greater 
safety.      This  was  not  a  view  shared  by  healthcare 
professionals, who instead on the whole tended to be more 
cynical about the new supply arrangement as the threat of 
counterfeits was still posed by parallel imports. 
  
Discussion  
Systems  modelling  is  a  key  feature  of  understanding  and 
improving  systems  design.    Systems  modelling  with 
stakeholders means the current performance and behaviour 
of  a  system  referred  to  the  ‘as-is’  process  model  can  be 
understood  and  evaluated.    Furthermore,  ‘to-be’  process 
models can be created alongside stakeholders and used to 
guide  the  implementation  of  system  changes  [13].    This 
paper has reflected on how the systems design approach 
can be applied to understand a health care domain problem 
of medication errors.  Process models that are powerful in 
their  ability  to  provide  both  simple  and  detail  graphical 
accounts of a system have been used in a hierarchal fashion 
to  uncover  system  design  issues  that  contribute  to 
medication error. 
 
The iterative modeling approach alongside the participants 
meant  that  this  approach  allowed  all  those  engaged  to 
consider the issues at the heart of a problem more widely 
and deeply (as has been demonstrated in the responses of 
interviewees  upon  reflection  with  the  models  in  the 
interview).    For  example,  emphasis  was  placed  on 
interactions  between  staff,  medicines  and  stages  of  the 
supply chain when participants actively annotated models.  
One  possible  reason  could  be  that  the  process  allowed 
interviewees more time to think and respond or that the 
system  models  highlighted  previously  unexplored 
interactions  or  connections  in  the  system.    These  more 
detailed responses led to a more sophisticated analysis of 
why  medication  error  persisted  and  how  these  could  be 
minimized  without  unbalancing  the  system  to  improve 
safety. 
 
The results reveal that risk to medication safety is perceived 
as  occurring  most  at  the  patient-end  of  the  medicines 
supply chain: the pharmacy and the ward.  Although this 
study  has  attempted  to  touch  on  the  role  of  the  wider 
supply  chain,  risk  perception  is  still  focused  on 
administration  of  medicines  by  nurses  and  dispensing  by 
pharmacies.    This  perhaps  reflects  an  attitude  that 
automation of the processes involved in the earlier stages of 
the  supply  chain  conferred  greater  safety.    Both  for  the 
ward  and  pharmacy,  workload  and  task  issues  seem  to 
compound  the  risk  of  error  revealing  that  strategies  that 
focus on the pathways leading to the pharmacy and ward 
should be considered with an equal weight in comparison to 
previous  strategies  that  tended  to  focus  on  the  ward  or 
pharmacy in isolation.  It is important to consider that the 
small sample size and purposive and snowballing sampling 
technique  may  have  introduced  bias  into  the  results.    A 
larger study may overcome this. 
 
The  risk  of  counterfeit  medicines  still  continued  despite 
changes in the manufacturer’s supply of medicine through 
logistic  service  providers  owing  mainly  to  sophisticated 
counterfeiting  techniques  and  parallel  import  channels  of 
supply.  Therefore, more evidence is needed to see if the 
scheme will improve safety and help deal with supply issues.  
It is important to point out that the scheme only relates to 
branded  medicines  (75%  of  the  medicines  market;  OFT, 
2007),  safety  related  issues  with  generic  and  unlicensed 
medicines are yet to be addressed.   
 
Furthermore, interviewees were concerned by the lack of 
safeguards  present  that  allowed  medication  errors  to  go 
undetected  to  the  patient.    More  safeguards  that  were 
embedded in the system were called for rather than relying 
than on checking and vigilance by staff, which under certain 
circumstances was difficult to maintain at the desired level.  
Careful  re-design  is  required  to  truly  embed  safety  in  a 
seamless  manner  rather  than  ‘add-on’  attempts  to  place 
more safeguards. 
 
Although  not  necessary,  it  is  useful  for  the  researcher  to 
possess  some  technical  ability  with  graphical  software 
programs  to  help  assist  with  the  model  drawing  process.  
This may put some researchers off from using this approach.  
Also the iterative modeling required can be time consuming 
but the benefits of this approach in eliciting more detailed 
responses  (in  comparison  to  qualitative  interviews  alone) 
allows  researchers  to  gain  insight  into  how  stakeholders 
believe the system operates.  More specifically, in this study 
it was possible to understand how medication error arises in 
the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper reflects on the use of a systems design, a mainly 
engineering  approach,  to  exploring  the  role  of  the 
pharmaceutical  supply  chain  in  medication  error.    The 
approach provided an enhanced insight into the complex set 
of  system  factors  and  interactions  involved  in  generating 
medication  errors  and  therefore  successful  in  highlighting 
opportunities  for  re-design  to  improve  safety.    A  wide 
number of stakeholders were engaged, including patients, 
demonstrating the flexibility of this approach to health care 
research.   
 
Patients receive their medicines from a multitude of routes 
in the medicines supply chain, but the current chain lacks 
integration.  More system safeguards that were seamlessly 
embedded  were  called  for  to  minimise  the  risk  from  Australasian Medical Journal 2009, 1, 11, 121-128 
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medication  error  and  counterfeit  medicines.    Further  risk 
management  and  systems  design  research  is  required  to 
help improve patient safety in delivering medicines in the 
NHS. 
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Figure 1: Process model of generic supply process 
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 Figure 2: Hospital Supply Process Model 
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 Figure 3: Community Pharmacy Supply Process Model 
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